Reflecting on two centuries since Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 1823
When Europeans found out about North America, they fought each other – and made treaties with each other – for the right to exclusive trading and treaty making there.
African emissaries didn’t do that. They merged and mixed, and made something of themselves among the Original Inhabitants, apparently, when you look at the gift of an ancient stone head which the Government of Mexico made to UN headquarters in New York City, early this century. The several-ton sculpture was distinctly an African head, made in Mexico, and older than Columbus by centuries. Mexico chose its moment well, at the time of ratification of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
But in 1823, the exact meaning of French, Spanish, and British dealings on the Atlantic coast of this continent were the subject of an elaborate judicial review by US Chief Justice John Marshall. The case at trial was a question of whether inheritors and tenants of land bought from the Illinois and Piankeshaw could keep their arrangement after the nations’ leadership made a treaty with the USA.
The appeal, or writ of error, was put to the Supreme Court primarily because the question of the foundations of land title in “British” North America required clarification generally.
In order to decide whether Johnson’s party (the plaintiff) had a claim against McIntosh (the defendant) for the right of possession, Marshall had to review all the facts. That is, what happens when an immigrant individual buys land from an independent American nation, and that nation subsequently sells their title, by way of treaty, to the new colonial US government? That is:
“The plaintiffs in this cause claim the land in their declaration mentioned under two grants purporting to be made, the first in 1773 and the last in 1775, by the chiefs of certain Indian tribes constituting the Illinois and the Piankeshaw nations, and the question is whether this title can be recognized in the courts of the United States?
“The facts, … show the authority of the chiefs who executed this conveyance …were in rightful possession of the land they sold. The inquiry, therefore, is in a great measure confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the courts of this country.”
To track the foundation of land title in North America, distinct from in Europe, through both constitutional and common law, he noted the inter-European treaties:
“But as they [Europeans] were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle was that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”
“The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers, but could not affect the rights of those already in possession, …. It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.”
To skip to the end of McIntosh, Marshall found that the USA could not credit, inherit, or guarantee, a previous land deal made by another nation. As he said earlier, the chiefs who executed the conveyance were in rightful possession of the land they sold. It was the USA who could not recognize their sale to anyone but “the sovereign claiming discovery.”
The USA was bound by the European treaties to only recognize an Indian surrender or sale of their title to the sovereign power which had made “discovery.” Thus the Plaintiff’s title derived by grant from the Indians could not be recognized by Marshall’s court. Mr. Johnson was not a sovereign power. He was, however, a Supreme Court Justice of the state: he should have known better.
And that is “the inalienable title” in Canada today: the crown had staked its right, against any other, to acquire title to the soil. The crown offered to the prospective sellers its protection in exchange. And that is the “fiduciary duty” – the crown would be nothing more than a hostage taker; a brute captor and slave driver (which it also was until 1807); unless it acted honourably towards the peoples it had just isolated from the free market by force of might. The duty is one of care; trust; and fair and equitable dealing.
Having acquired the exclusive right to buy the land, honour would not permit the discovering sovereign to deal sharply, to coerce a sale, nor to deny the Original Inhabitants their right to occupation and possession until a sale was made.
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Aboriginal title – in spite of Marshall, or as aided by the Chief Justice?
Marshall’s decision has provided a pivot in verifying land titles against the US and Canada across North America, since those countries presumed to abandon their foundations in constitutional democracy; the one-truth of Christianity; the rule of law; etcetera, in the 1870s. Both countries put the land race ahead of law.
It is a live issue in British Columbia, if not all of Canada, as Bruce Clark wrote in 2019:
10. Faced with the prospect that the Indians might not “sell” at ridiculously low prices the “Protection” duty of the crown and its law officers knowingly and intentionally was corrupted by the judiciary, not necessarily for the direct benefit of any individual judge or lawyer, but rather in the service of the newcomer public’s interest in stealing the Indians’ possession and usurping their jurisdiction.
11. Specifically, in the 1870s the governments of both the USA and Canada dealt with this threat by invading, occupying, and governing the yet unceded indigenous national territories under the auspices of their own legislation, regardless of the absence of treaties. The legal profession and judges permitted and led the invasion.[i]
The Indian Act, 1876, is one of the most well-known mechanisms of this invasion and arbitrary government.
In R. v. White and Bob, 1964, the Snuneymuxw defendants cited Marshall extensively. They were defending their 1854 treaty right to “hunt as formerly” around Nanaimo against a rogue Canadian province that had, by 1964, invested almost a century’s worth of Indian Agents to illegally and extra-judicially stamp out their economic activities down to the most basic, essential, sustenance hunting and fishing. The Snuneymuxw hunters won, and their treaty with Governor James Douglas, Vancouver’s Island, was recognized as a treaty by the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court of Canada sent it back in 1965 with a one-line ruling confirming the provincial court’s decision.
Else the court would have had to contend with this excerpt, among others, in a 131-page Defendants’ Factum prepared for a potential hearing in front of the Supreme court of Canada:
“c. Aboriginal title and aboriginal occupancy in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence
“The concept of aboriginal title and native rights flowing therefrom has long been recognized by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. In a series of famous judgments in the 19th century the Supreme Court of the United States dealt with questions relating to the nature of Indian title
The Respondents submit the judgment in Johnson vs. McIntosh is of great importance in determining the aboriginal rights of the Indians of the West Coast, for the reasons given by Norris J.A.:
…The judgment in Johnson vs. McIntosh (supra) was delivered at an early stage of exploration of this continent and when controversy as to those rights was first becoming of importance. Further on the consideration of the subject matter of this Appeal, it is to be remembered that it was delivered only five years after the Convention of 1818 between Great Britain and the United States providing that the northwest coast of America should be free and open for the term of ten years to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of both powers in order to avoid disputes between the powers. The rights of Indians were naturally an incident of the implementation of a common policy which was perforce effective as applying to what is now Vancouver Island and the territory of Washington and Oregon, all of which were then Hudson’s Bay territories. For these reasons and because the judgment in Johnson v. McIntosh was written at a time of active exploration and exploitation of the West by the Americans, it is of particular importance.”
It is still of particular importance. Modern judgments in Canada’s Supreme Court have whittled the meaning of Aboriginal title down to “reconciliation” and “the right to be consulted and accommodated.” They have defined the meaning of “land title” almost completely out of “Aboriginal title.”
In 2014 the Tsilhqot’in won a Declaration of Aboriginal Title to much of their national territory. Ten years later, the governments refuse to know how to implement that, and precious little has changed – while gold mining corporations have since barged on with work in the declared title areas, and there is no taxation scheme in place to direct property taxes to the Tsilhqot’in.
Today’s Chief Justices do not encourage or support declarations of title, they fight them as they just did in the case of the Nuu-chat-laht this year, and they all say that the “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights” of the 1982 Constitution Act will find their full expression through negotiated final agreements. But those negotiations are financed, mandated, controlled, and arbitrated by the federal government of Canada.
If the fiduciary duty were intact, the government would have investigated and positively identified Aboriginal title areas, in accordance with the Aboriginal perspective in each case; protect the constitutional rights that flow from them; offer a competitive purchase price for any land that might be considered for sale by the Aboriginal title holders; and otherwise stay out of them.
Instead, the negotiations – the governments insisting on denying any real property rights in the Original Inhabitants – are conducted under duress, where forced deprivation and subordination surround and isolate small Indian Reserves which were never accepted as a settlement of anything; against a backdrop of unaffordable and adversarial litigation before biased judges; and, on the other hand, roadblocks crashed by Emergency Response Teams and the military. The fiduciary duty is not intact.
In his follow-up to the omnibus sweep of Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall said more clearly:
“The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man. They were well understood to convey the title which, according to the common law of European sovereigns respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. This was the right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell. The crown could not be understood to grant what the crown did not affect claim; nor was it so understood.
… “The king purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them. He also purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self government, so far as respected themselves only.”
That was in Worcester v. Georgia, 1832, and a political response was soon issued. President Andrew Jackson told the world: “Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” The great state of Georgia sent the Cherokee away, out of their homeland, on a Trail of Tears.
In 2006, the Indigenous Peoples and Nations Coalition of Alaska and Hawaii completely rejected the USA’s application of the 1823 ruling, in their shadow report to the UN Human Rights Committee concerning the USA’s implementation report:
“The Tee-Hit-Ton (1955) and Johnson v. McIntosh cases affirmed the direct application of the racist Doctrine of Manifest Destiny, Doctrine of Incorporation and several other ‘doctrines’ or derogatory principles to effectively subjugate, dominate and exploit Alaska and Hawaii under the auspices of domestic dependent Federal Indian Law right under the noses of the Decolonization Committee and the General Assembly of the United Nations.”[ii]
Perhaps the States relied only on key selections of Marshall’s law, not to be confused with martial law, going to the markedly ethnic superiority of lines like,
“On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all, and the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendency. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity in exchange for unlimited independence.”
Incidentally, property owners in Hawaii buy “title insurance” along with their home insurance. It protects their interests in the event of a successful Hawaiian title claim against the property they bought from an American government which never legally acquired title to it.
If the 1823 ruling is to be thrown out, then out with it goes the foundation of every claim to a right to lawfully proceed in treaty making in North America. Along with it, the concept of the rule of law as a basis for constitutional democracy. If the 1823 ruling is to be kept, in its entirety, then out goes every Canadian or US claim to ownership of lands which did not conform to the constitutional requirement set out therein:
“According to the theory of the British Constitution, the royal prerogative is very extensive so far as respects the political relations between Great Britain and foreign nations. The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered in some respects as a dependent and in some respects as a distinct people occupying a country claimed by Great Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required that means should be adopted for the preservation of peace, and that their friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites, and the power to do this was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the Crown.”
- CJ Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh
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Magna Carta, 1215, and the Royal Proclamation, 1763
Britain may have asserted sovereignty on the Atlantic seaboard, and across North America, but they knew they did not own the land. At least, their American successors at law knew it in 1823 – but they later seemed not to know it in, say, 1876; 1912; 1926; 1973; etc.
What they knew in 1823, what Marshall knew, was:
“Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
“In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were in no instance entirely disregarded, but were necessarily to a considerable extent impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”
The concept of “sovereignty” following chartered sailors across an ocean becomes difficult to translate to pluri-national, multi-theistic states of the 21st century, and non-stop global migration by princes, billionaires, and multi-national companies. To wit, in 1823 (and long since before 1492) the Romans of conquered Europe considered themselves descendants of the One True God, bar none. The superiority of Christianity simply melted competing nations’ founding mythologies, according to the colonial lore.
Still, they were held to a standard, and the local feudal lords of England enforced a standard as well – Magna Carta, 1215 – in much the same way Pontiac and his Allies forced the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
It had been about the same amount of time between contact and manifesto in both cases; from 1066-1215 for the British, and from about 1550-1763 for the North American nations. Magna Carta, by order of the Roman Catholic King, constitutionalized the monarch’s rights and their limitations. For instance, if the crown made a claim to possessing title to land, they had to prove their claim in court against any challenger. Landholders were protected “against arbitrary exercise of power by a sovereign that enjoyed immunity in its own courts prior to the enactment of modern crown liability statutes.”[iii]
And also, according to the common law (which predates the Roman law): “the dignity of the crown” prevents it from acquiring possession, rightly or wrongly, by physical occupation of the land. For the crown to have possession, of its own, in land, it must have a title of record, as in a memorial of a court or legislative body.
In America, the Royal Proclamation was, in effect, an Executive Order extending the sense of Magna Carta to the colonial governors. King George III just wrote it up specific to North America.
In the same way that Roman and Norman colonizers of England, centuries before, were held to the judicious standard they professed to be introducing to “the heathens” – they were made to recognize the titles and jurisdictions of the peoples who built Stonehenge; so the new British monarchy found itself unable to hold any ground without the support of the Original Inhabitants (and their military leaders) in North America.
By 1763, France had lost the Seven Years War against Britain. Along with the war, France lost its Native Allies to Britain, and its interests in settlements, trading, and treaty making specific to a massive series of nations from the St. Lawrence River to Nova Scotia, and south of there.
And King George sent the Royal Proclamation to the Governors to arrest the settler invasion-in-progress of “the Indian Nations, with Whom We are Aligned.” They call that proclamation the “Indian Charter of Rights.”
Several American colonies revolted two years later and declared Independence from Britain over the next decade. The Americans took exception to a number of provisions in that “Charter,” and a few unrelated taxation issues, and what had been colonies of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland et al, became independent states – soon to be united states.
In 1823, Chief Justice Marshall trod carefully in his young nation, but he did bring up the Proclamation in consideration of those North American nations whose land had not been, “… ceded to or purchased by Us”:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live under Our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds; We do therefore, with the Advice of Our Privy Council, declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, that no Governor or Commander in Chief…do presume, upon any Pretence whatever, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass any Patents for Lands…upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.”
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The Christian nations of Europe assumed their dominion over new lands,
“… ‘then unknown to all Christian people,’… Thus asserting a right to take possession notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and at the same time admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have made a previous discovery.”
In another way, other faith-based empires encouraged conversion by recognizing rights based on personal religious beliefs. The spread of Islam, for instance, was improved by the clause for protection of Muslims from enslavement by other Muslims. In areas like Indonesia, when, at the relevant time, slavery was a real part of the social strata, individuals could give themselves into indentured service if they had no land or tenure. Islam was often embraced by people of that class.
Perhaps the Europeans’ law is really a matter of faith. There have been plenty of dark nights of the soul where law and faith were lost. For instance, Henry III sent John Cabot out on a royal charter to get colonies in the Americas, in direct contravention of the 1493 Papal Bull assigning half of… whatever lay to the west of Europe… to Spain, and half to Portugal. At that time, the Pope would have been the head of Henry’s church and the touchstone of monarchic divinity.
Nevertheless, Christian Britain did indeed outcompete Christian Spain and Portugal. And France. And Christian Spain did war with Christian France; Portugal with Spain; Holland with Britain; etcetera.
In the case we’re discussing here, Thomas Johnson was, in fact, a Supreme Court Judge. If anyone, in 1773 and 1775, should have known that the content of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 forbade any individual from making purchases in their own name from the Indians, it was Thomas Johnson, SCJ.
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References:
Full text of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. McIntosh, 1823: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/21/543/
R. v White and Bob, 1965 Respondent’s Factum to Supreme Court of Canada
[i] Bruce Clark, LL.B., in “Ongoing Genocide caused by Judicial Suppression of the “Existing” Aboriginal Right,” 2019.
[ii] Shadow report to UN Human Rights Committee concerning the USA’s implementation report, by the Indigenous Peoples and Nations Coalition, 2006
[iii] Professor Kent McNeil, in “The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title,” Osgoode Hall Law School, 1999.
The West Wasn't Won 